Apologetics 1 - Personal Knowledge
17 January 2008 by Gil
So where to begin a course that aims to demonstrate the plausibility of the Christian faith? It seems to me that any discussion of whether or not Christianity makes sense, whether or not God can be known (indeed whether or not God even exists) must start with a theory of knowledge. What kind of knowledge are we talking about? What kinds of criteria should we be using?
On questions like these I depend heavily on Lesslie Newbigin’s Proper Confidence, a powerful little book that makes a strong case for the idea that the noun ‘knowledge’ ought always to be modified by the adjective ‘personal’. What does he mean? Newbigin basically argues that the idea of ‘objective knowledge,’ the notion that we can stand as detached observers making objective judgements on truth and falsehood is largely an illusion.
Knowledge is irreducibly personal because all knowing involves a subjective self (with biases, limitations and assumptions) confronting an external reality that is at least partially hidden. All knowledge requires a knower and this knower brings a lot of baggage to the process before the fact.
Recognizing this forces us to admit that there is a level of personal risk and commitment involved with truth claims because it is not possible to resolve all doubts before making a choice (especially in the so-called ultimate questions of meaning and purpose). The refusal to commit for fear of being wrong is a failure of nerve. Faith, far from being a weak form of knowledge, is a prerequisite to knowledge.
The commitment, the leap of faith that we must all make concerns the question of whether reality as we experience it is at rock bottom personal or impersonal. If reality is impersonal then rational explanation of cause and effect relationships would be sufficient (since what is is all there is). If we could explain the machine we would have succeeded in what we set out to do.
But if reality is, in fact, personal then something new is introduced into the equation, that being the possibility that there is some kind of relationship between the knower and the known. Some kind of personal response is required and like all relationships, this would involve a level of risk.
The point is that there is no way of adjudicating between these two options. Reason alone will not explain reality if that reality is somehow personal (the notion of purpose is key for Newbigin - how do we account for the pervasive reality of purpose in the universe when it is only persons that can entertain purposes?). To argue that ultimate reality submit exclusively to the bar of empirical proof is to have already made the decision in advance.
Sounds like an interesting start for the class! It made me realize some assumptions of mine and subsequently provided inspiration for some specific approaches to the study of consciousness.
I realized I’ve been assuming the “personal” to be a sentient action of the impersonal, thereby making somewhat of a combination of your “two options”. So, for me (so far), “reality as we experience it” can only be personal, but the prerequisite to our experience is the rock bottom impersonal you mentioned.
Thanks for being a research catalyst for me.
By the way, I was wondering what you thought about the power of influence in the relationship between faith and reason. Is it mutual or directed one way? And if it is mutual, which one do you think is the greater influence? Or should be the greater influence?
Jerry,
I’m not sure how I could decide which of the two (faith or reason) should take priority. I would tend toward seeing them as mutually supporting. Again, we tend to view faith as what we resort to when knowledge isn’t available when it might be better to speak of ‘faithful responses’ to what seems rational.
Sorry if that seems like I’m dodging the question (interpretation: I have no idea).
I don’t know if my questions are implying what takes priority. If it helps, what I was trying to get at was - do you think both faith and reason are subject to change by the other? In other words, can the faith we put in something change as a result of the work of reason? And, can our tools of reason be changed by the work of faith?
I don’t know if I’m being clear above. Maybe I should respond to your statement: “I would tend toward seeing them as mutually supporting.” So, does that you mean, if you drew a line between faith and reason, neither of them could, or should, cross the line into the other?
I think the line between faith and reason is artificial. So if you’re asking whether or not reason can clarify or correct things that were previously taken ‘on faith’ I would say yes. Alternatively I would say that a proper recognition of the limitations of reason (including the assumptions that underwrite it) could be better explained by faith.
So change is certainly possible but I react against the dominant view (at least since the Enlightenment) that reason will eventually get rid of the need for any faith at all. This, as I said above, fails to properly consider the role of the human subject in knowing and rules out the possibility of truth being in some sense personal.
So I see a fatal flaw in the assumption that faith and reason are opposed to one another as competing theories of explanation. Reason depends on faith and faith depends on reason. Again, I’m using the word ‘faith’ here not in the religious sense but in the sense of trusting in the truth of assumptions that cannot be empirically verified.
I’m inclined to agree with you on the extinction of faith.
“I would say that a proper recognition of the limitations of reason (including the assumptions that underwrite it) could be better explained by faith.”
How so? I agree that the line between faith and reason does seem artificial when we acknowledge that reason can cross over that line to change faith. But when reason reveals its own limitations, what I understand as a line it is currently incapable of crossing, what value is there for faith to cross over this line into reason?
I know that faith can provide a foundation for reason to play/work on, but what faith does to reason is still a conundrum to me.
I think your idea of faith as a foundation is a good one. I don’t necessarily think faith does anything to reason other than give it a proper sense of what it can do and what it cannot. This could lead to a certain humility in the process of learning, a recognition of our limitations and our dependency on a reality outside of ourselves (I would obviously see this reality as God).
My only point is that we all start from the same place. We all face up to a reality that is beyond ourselves, a reality that remains mysterious and open to interpretation. Given this kind of a world, we all must exercise a certain level of trust - trust that our most basic assumptions about the ‘ultimate questions’ (meaning, purpose or lack thereof) is true.
The whole idea of a ‘line’ that faith and reason cross over is confusing to me. Take an example of a phenomenon that was historically explained with reference to God - the origins of the universe. Many people take it as self-evident that we no longer need ‘the God hypothesis’ to explain this phenomenon any longer. That particular issue has moved across the line from faith to reason.
But has it? Does our knowledge of the inner workings the ‘machine’ of life on planet earth get us off the hook of asking the even more basic question of why there is something rather than nothing and whether or not life means anything? These are still questions that rely profoundly on assumptions that stubbornly refuse to submit to rational enquiry alone (though reason is still essential in the process of making decisions here).
So I see some mixture of faith and reason operating at most levels of knowledge, especially when that knowledge seeks to address questions of meaning and purpose.
“I don’t necessarily think faith does anything to reason other than give it a proper sense of what it can do and what it cannot.”
Again, neither of us have demonstrated how it’s possible that faith “gives” or “explains” a “proper sense” of what reason can or cannot do. I think reason can do this, but faith seems to be nothing more (in the non-religious sense) than a suspension of disbelief.
That is a great book… Perhaps some of the material from this class could find its way into adult Sunday school?
Jerry, all I’m really trying to make a case for here is that reason has limits and that it may not be the only tool in the box when it comes to the whole process of ‘knowing’. To define faith as the suspension of disbelief is to assume that doubt is the default position and that only that which is empirically verifiable counts as ‘true’. This is to have already made a decision (on faith) about the impersonal nature of truth.
Sorry if this isn’t answering your questions but I’m not quite sure how else to say it.
“To define faith as the suspension of disbelief is to assume that doubt is the default position”
Would you mind elaborating on what you mean by this?
I mean that defining faith this way assumes that disbelief or skepticism is the normal position to be taken on matters that can’t be empirically verified. “I won’t believe until you prove it to me” reflects a decision that has been made prior to the process, a decision that reflects a certain view of both truth and the process of knowledge.
So, faith, for you, exists without doubt?
Not at all. I’m simply describing two alternative starting points. On the one hand you can start from the position of saying (as Descartes did) that anything that cannot be proved must be doubted. This view assumes that rational certainty is the only standard against which the word ‘true’ could be measured.
On the other you start from the position that is more open to the possibility of other forms of knowing (including the complexities of the knowledge of persons). Faith would obviously be valued more highly in the second of these two options but this would by no means preclude the possibility of doubt. In fact, it’s difficult to see how it possibly could.
Gil, I find your understanding of faith to be very confusing. Do you believe that “other forms of knowing” are experienced when faith is applied to anything, calling all those things ‘true’? I’m curious to know what standards you have for the use of faith.
I’m not sure how many different ways I can say this Jerry. I ‘know’ a good friend in a different way than I ‘know’ that the square root of 16 is 4. All I’m really trying to make a case for is the idea that ‘knowing’ ultimate truth is more like knowing a person (or at least includes that kind of knowing).
That kind of knowledge will never seem 100% certain, it will always be open to doubt. That kind of knowledge will always require making some kind of decision regarding what to do with that uncertainty. That decision, that risk, that commitment is what I mean by ‘faith’.
And all of us are forced to commit, either to a personal or an impersonal vision of truth. There is no court of appeal that could possibly help us decide between these two. We simply act in faith.
“That decision, that risk, that commitment is what I mean by ‘faith’.”
My contention throughout this conversation has not been with this definition of faith, it’s what you’ve said in addition to this definition - specifically, faith as explanation. (I think I was fairly clear about this in the 3rd, 5th, and 7th comment. If you’d rather not address this contention, just say so, Gil.)
Again, my point was that I don’t think we can use faith to provide or explain ideas, only commit to them. Reason, on the other hand, can explore the optional ideas provided by our minds, whether the options be material or immaterial, recognizable or fantastical. Reason can challenge these ideas (whether people have faith in them or not), test them for logical consistency, provide evaluation and correction if needed. And, reason can explain them.
Anyways, thanks for the dialogue. And I’m looking forward to hearing more about your apologetics class!
Jerry
Jerry I’m not exactly sure how I’ve claimed that faith is a method of explanation (as if it explains some things and reason explains others). If I’ve led you to that conclusion then I should have been clearer.
I think I’ve tried to say that both are necessary in the pursuit of truth but I have never tried to argue that faith explains things in the same way that reason does. I do think that people who think that reason is the only tool in the toolbox make some fundamental mistakes about the nature of knowledge and the nature of truth but I don’t think that’s the same thing as saying the faith is a rival method of explanation.
So yes, faith is about committing to ideas, not empirically verifying them. My point all along has been that the meaning of reality is not completely accessible to us if empirical verification is our only standard of truth.
So to put the question to you: do you believe that reason has limits? Do you believe that the meaning of reality is fully explainable without taking some unproved assumptions as a starting point? Put another way, do you think that there is any rational way of deciding whether or not ultimate reality is personal or impersonal?
Before turning back to highlight what you’ve communicated in our conversation, I’ll respond specifically to your last comment.
“Jerry I’m not exactly sure how I’ve claimed that faith is a method of explanation (as if it explains some things and reason explains others). If I’ve led you to that conclusion then I should have been clearer… I think I’ve tried to say that both are necessary in the pursuit of truth but I have never tried to argue that faith explains things IN THE SAME WAY that reason does.” (my emphasis)
Saying that faith explains things in a different way than reason is still saying that faith explains something.
“My point all along has been that the meaning of reality is not completely accessible to us if empirical verification is our only standard of truth.”
I recognize that this is your main point (which you’ve repeated in the conversation), but you make some serious claims adjacent to the main point (intentionally or unintentionally) that shouldn’t be ignored - “I would say that a proper recognition of the limitations of reason (including the assumptions that underwrite it) could be better explained by faith“… “I don’t necessarily think faith does anything to reason other than give it a proper sense of what it can do and what it cannot.”” (The giving of a proper sense can only be done via explanation.)
And now I’ll respond to your last three questions:
(1) Do you believe that reason has limits?
See what I said in 5th comment - “when reason reveals its own limitations, what I understand as a line it is currently incapable of crossing”
(2) Do you believe that the meaning of reality is fully explainable without taking some unproved assumptions as a starting point? No.
(3) Do you think that there is any rational way of deciding whether or not ultimate reality is personal or impersonal?
I think there is a rational way, but the choice is ultimately without a reason, it is a faith commitment (capable of being changed). I think we can influence this decision with a rational understanding of what can be repeatedly demonstrated about our current experiences of reality.
Like the ‘chicken and egg’ riddle, everyone has to decide for themselves through faith with reason whether the first of all existence is exclusively a personal being or an ever-changing universe that at times is both impersonal and personal (no one knows if other life forms have existed on other planets before life on earth began - but it’s possible).
Faith, if possible, should always be informed.
If you object to the word ‘explanation’ in connection to faith then I can try to rephrase. All I mean is ‘my interpretation of reality coheres better when I take these unproved assumptions as a starting point’.
It’s the coherence between my ideas and beliefs and my lived experience that I’m after and I think that goal is aided by faith (and is impossible without faith). If that constitutes ‘explanation’ then we’ve probably reached a dead end (I’m a little confused by your repeated reaction against these two words being used together. Am I missing something important?).
Thank you for answering my questions. I would obviously disagree with you on #3 but I appreciate the clarity with which you answered.
As to your last statement, I agree wholeheartedly.